Workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively. But a union cannot detain or force workers to join or not join a union. A union cannot threaten workers with losing their jobs if it does not support the trade union organization. A union cannot induce an employer to discriminate against employees with regard to working and employment conditions. A union must negotiate wages, hours of work and other working conditions in good faith. A union cannot boycott or hit an employer who is a customer or supplier of an employer it is trying to organize.19 Requiring certification through card control can increase the level of union organizing, while the requirement for secret ballots can reduce it. Research suggests that when recognition of card exams is required, unions are engaged in more union action and the success rate of unions is higher. The success rate of trade unions is also higher when recognition is combined with a neutrality agreement (i.e. an agreement in which the employer agrees to remain neutral during a trade union organisation campaign). Employers may take action against trade union organizations.13 Employers may require their employees to attend meetings during working hours where management can present their position on the union organization.
These meetings are called “captive public” meetings. Employers may not hold meetings with captive auditors during the 24-hour period preceding an election. Supervisors may provide employees with written information (including memos and letters) and hold one-on-one meetings with employees. On the other hand, increasing workers` bargaining power in competitive labour markets can lead to misallocation of resources and reduce overall economic performance and consumer satisfaction. In competitive labour markets, higher union wages can reduce the employment of unionized workers below the level that would exist without union organizing.112 If unions reduce employment in the unionized sector, they can increase the supply of workers to employers in the non-unionized sector and increase the relative wages of non-unionized workers. lower.113 The 13. In November 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Unite HERE Local 355 v. Martin Mulhall; Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc. d/b/a Mardi Gras Gaming. The case concerns a neutrality agreement between Mardi Gras Gaming and UNITE HERE Local 355.
The employer agreed to recognize the union if the majority of employees signed authorization cards. The employer agreed not to oppose union representation, to let the union on its property speak to the workers and to provide the union with the names and addresses of the workers. The union agreed not to strike, picket or take other economic action against the employer as long as the neutrality agreement was in place. The union also agreed to financially support a Florida state election initiative through casino games. The issue in this case is whether the agreement between the employer and the union constitutes a violation of section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (i.e. the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §186). Under section 302, it is illegal for an employer to “pay, lend or deliver” something of value to a union, or for a union to accept something of value from an employer. (UNITE HERE Local 355 by Martin Mulhall; Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc. d/b/a Mardi Gras Gaming, sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/12-99-Mulhall-cert-petition.pdf, pp. 3-7.
On December 10, 2013, the court dismissed the case as “recklessness granted.” U.S. Supreme Court, UNITE HERE Local 355, Petitioner v. Martin Mulhall et al., No. 12-99, www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-99_o7jp.pdf. Although a company is not allowed to sell directly to consumers in another state or to buy from companies in another state, its activities still affect trade. For example, the activities of a manufacturer who sells all of its products to a retailer in the same state may affect trade if that retailer sells to consumers in another state. NLRB, NLRA Basic Guide, p. 33. Although employers have the right to fight against trade union organisation, they cannot interfere, restrict or force workers to form or join a trade union. An employer cannot threaten its employees with losing their jobs or benefits if they vote for or join a union. An employer cannot threaten to close a factory if workers choose to be represented by a union. An employer cannot raise wages to discourage workers from joining a union or forming a union.
An employer may not discriminate against employees on the basis of union activities related to terms and conditions of employment (e.g. dismissal, downgrading or issuing unfavourable work orders). An employer must negotiate wages, hours of work and other working conditions in good faith.18 There is also evidence that recognizing card checks as part of a neutrality agreement can be more effective. A study of unionization efforts in the United States concluded that union success rates are higher when a card control agreement is combined with a neutrality agreement. The study examined 57 card control agreements with 294 organizational campaigns. Unions had a success rate of 78.2% in actions combining the recognition of card checks with a neutrality agreement, and a success rate of 62.5% in cases where there was only one card control agreement.100 Requiring a card control certification can increase the number of organizing campaigns and the success rate of unions. Conversely, the demand for secret ballot boxes can reduce the number of organizing campaigns and the success rate of unions. Compared to existing recognition procedures, the requirement for secret ballots may lower the level of union organization, while the requirement for card verification certification may increase it. As a result, the requirement for card verification certification can improve or impair economic efficiency, depending on the competitiveness of labour markets. Similarly, calling for secret ballots can improve or impair efficiency.
However, if either of the two changes has been made, it can be difficult to predict or measure the magnitude of the impact. In the province of Ontario, card cheque recognition was permitted prior to 1995. A secret ballot has been required since November 1995. A study of 3,564 certification applications before and after the secret ballot found that the certification rate was higher with the use of card checks. Following the switch to the secret ballot, the union success rate increased from 72.7% to 64.3%. On the other hand, larger bargaining units were held by secret ballot. The average size of units certified by secret ballot was 63.1 workers, compared to an average of 36.3 employees under card control recognition. The average size of the bargaining units in which the organizing campaigns took place was also larger after the launch of the secret ballots; 63.1 employees compared to 39.7 employees under card verification. As part of the recognition of card cheques, a union was certified if 55% of employees signed cards. In the case of secret ballots, elections are usually held within five working days of the date of the request. The study covered both private and public employers, but excluded the construction industry.98 The use of interest arbitration to resolve bargaining impasses has mainly occurred in the public sector, where the right to strike is generally restricted or prohibited.
In the private sector, workers` legal right to strike and lockout employers may encourage the parties to enter into a contractual agreement.77 Nevertheless, unions and private sector employers may voluntarily agree to use interest rate arbitration to resolve bargaining deadlocks.78 Requiring a card check when a majority of workers sign authorization cards can reduce the success rate of the Increase the number of unions. It is uncertain whether the requirement for a card verification certificate reverses the decline in private sector unionization in the United States. Decreased employment in unionized businesses and revocations of certification may offset an increase in the number of union members due to the recognition of card checks. In addition, the requirement for recognition of the card examination may increase the employer`s resistance to the collection of authorization cards. To the extent that the request for secret ballots or the application for certification, if a majority of workers sign authorization cards, would affect the degree of unionization, the economic impact may depend on how labour markets fit into the model of perfect competition. Requiring card verification certification can improve worker performance and reduce income inequality – if more workers are unionized. Calling for a secret ballot can increase pay inequality – if fewer workers are unionized. A card control system can be combined with a neutrality agreement. Not all neutrality agreements are created equal. In general, however, under a neutrality agreement, the employer agrees to remain neutral during a organizing campaign. The employer may agree not to attack or criticize the union, while the union may agree not to attack or criticize the employer.